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Abstract
The Interbank Offered Rate is a vital  benchmark interest  rate in the financial markets of every 
country  to  which  financial  contracts  are  tied.  In  the  light  of  the  recent  LIBOR  manipulation 
incident, this paper seeks to address the fear that Interbank Offered Rate are entirely controlled by 
the bank. The paper will focus on the comparison between LIBOR and SIBOR especially with 
regards to the behavior of the interest rate with time. Because of the nature of IBORs, banks will  
naturally be submitting similar rates which should not differ excessively from the market as well as 
the other banks. We will compare the LIBOR and SIBOR from 2005 to 2011 with respect to the 1  
month rates on an annual basis. We will present the result that the SIBOR is not manipulated like 
LIBOR. 
Introduction
The LIBOR scandal first erupted in 2008 at the height of the 2007-2009 Global Financial crisis. 
Wall Street Journal first released a study indicating that the banks were deliberately understating the 
rates in an attempt to improve their financial positions. Both the BIS and BBA responded with 
statements indicating the reliability of the rates quoted citing the difficulties in the financial markets 
for the discrepancies in the rates published. This position is further supported by the IMF's regular 
reports. However, an independent group of researchers(Snider and Youle, 2010) did find results 
which corroborated with the Wall Street Journal article. However, the researchers believe that the 
banks were attempting to  profit  from the movements  in  the rates  rather  than strengthening the 
banks' positions. 
With the new results, financial and fraud investigation commenced on several international banks 
including Barclays which is the first bank to admit to LIBOR fixing. This investigation rapidly 
spread to other financial markets such as Canada and Singapore. Many issues and concerns were 
raised by the financial regulators about the importance of separation of powers and whether new 
cross-boundary regulations should be implemented to prevent a repeat of the incident. Others seek a 
complete overhaul fo the IBOR calculation framework in hope that it will prevent manipulations. In 
the following section, we will be demonstrating how the cluster analysis of time series can be used 
to detect such irregularities and how the IBORs are currently affected by the manipulations. 
Time Series Clustering
While time series data incorporate time as a dimension, performing clustering on time series is 
similar to the clustering on static data. The technique employed to form clusters depends on the type 
of data available as well as the purpose and application of the analysis. Given the nature of time 
series, most time series data are continuous values and univariate in nature. 
While there are several algorithms developed solely for the purpose of clustering time series data of 
different nature, they are all similar in their approach of modifying existing non time series data 
algorithms  to  manage  time  series.  This  approach  assumes  raw time  series  data  otherwise  also 
known as raw-data-based approach and normally involves data pre-processing to covert the time 
series data to a normal static form. Once the data has been pre-processed, the classical static data 
clustering algorithms can then be applied. 
Every clustering algorithms relies on a suitable measure to compute either distance or similarity 
between  two  time  series.  Certain  particular  measure  might  be  more  appropriate  than  another 
depending on the type of time series in question. Most clustering algorithms are iterative in nature 
and rely on a suitable criterion to determine whether clustering obtained is in good condition to stop 
the iterative process. There were extensive discussions about the problems of using the Euclidean 
distance in the comparison of time series (Keogh, Lin and Truppel, 2003). However, most of the 
criticisms  are  targeted  at  the  pattern  recognition  of  time series  behaviors.  Subsequent  research 
indicated  that  in  certain  cases  where  pure  pattern  recognition  is  not  the  main  objective,  direct 
application  of  the  Euclidean distance  measure  as  the  main  clustering  input  does  not  affect  the 
effectiveness of the technique (Chen, 2005).
 
The hierarchical clustering method works by grouping data objects into a tree of clusters. There are 
two types of hierarchical clustering methods. The two major clustering process are agglomerative or 
divisive  depending  upon  whether  the  bottom-up  or  top-down  strategy  is  followed.  The 
agglomerative approach is more commonly used than the divisive method. The algorithm starts by 
having each object in its own cluster and start merging the atomic clusters into larger and larger 
clusters  until  all  the  objects  are  in  a  single  cluster.  The  single  linkage  approach measures  the 
similarity between two clusters using the similarity of the closest pair of data points between the 
clusters. The closest two clusters are merged and the process repeats merging until all the clusters  
forms one cluster. The Ward’s minimum variance approach differs by merging the two clusters that 
minimally increase the value of the sum-of-squares variance. At every step, all possible mergers of 
two  clusters  are  tried  and  the  one  with  the  smallest  increase  is  selected.  The  agglomerative 
hierarchical clustering method often suffers from adjustment problem. Hierarchical clustering is not 
restricted to cluster time series with equal length and can be extended to series of unequal length 
with the appropriate distance measure. 
IBOR rate mechanism
The IBOR rate mechanism is extremely similar across the various countries and jurisidictions. The 
most common cited IBOR is the LIBOR which was standardized in 1984 by the British Bankers' 
Association as the main reference rate for numerous securities which includes syndicated loans, 
futures contracts  and forward rate agreements.  The LIBOR is also used to as the reference for 
unsecured instruments  between banks in  London and globally.  Globally,  all  the  IBORs behave 
similarly to LIBOR in that they are quoted daily for several major currencies. 
The various IBORs rely on a panel of selected banks to provide daily rate qoutes for the calculation 
of the IBOR. The banks are selected based a variety of criteria such as size of operation, reputation 
as  well  as  capabilities  and knowledge of  the  currency  concerned.  Typically,  the  biggest  banks 
operating in the particular currency will be consulted for the rates.
 
Currently, Libor is defined as the rate at which an individual Contributor Panel bank could borrow 
funds, were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size, 
just prior to 11.00 London time.(BBA, 2012)
This definition is further broken down into the following sections (BBA, 2012):
•The submitted rate must be formed from that bank’s estimated cost of funds in the interbank 
market.
•Contributions must represent rates formed in London only.
•Contributions addressed only the currency concerned and does not seek to address the cost 
of producing one currency by borrowing in another currency and accessing the required 
currency via the foreign exchange markets.
•The  rates  must  be  submitted  by  members  of  staff  at  a  bank  with  charged  with  the 
management of a bank’s cash.
•The “funds” is defined as the unsecured interbank cash or cash raised via the issuance of 
interbank Certificates of Deposit.
Every  Panel  Bank  is  required  to  directly  input  its  data  no  later  than  a given time  for  each  
day  that  the  capital market is open. After the given time, an appointed agent will then process the 
calculation. Usually, for each maturity, the agent will eliminate the highest and lowest X% of all the 
quotes collected to eliminate the outliers. The remaining rates will be averaged and rounded to three 
decimal places. It is precisely this approach that resulted in the 2012 LIBOR Scandal.
LIBOR Scandal
The Libor scandal is a series of events that consist of fraudulent actions by the bank with regards to 
their behaviors with regards to the  LIBOR. The incidents arose when the banks' action of falsely 
inflating  or  deflating  their  rates  so  as  to  profit  from  trades  and  implant  false  impression  of 
creditworthiness. 
As mentioned in the earlier section, the banks are supposed to submit the actual interest rates they 
are paying (or based on their expectation) for borrowing from other banks. The Libor behaves like 
an overall assessment of the health of the financial system and acts as the litmus test for financial 
health of the banks. If the banks being polled feel confident about the state of affair, they will report 
a low number and vice versa in a situation of low confidence.
As Libor is used in U.S. derivatives markets as a benchmark, any attempt to manipulate Libor is 
considered to be an attempt to manipulate U.S. derivatives markets and violates the American laws. 
Since  many  financial  products  rely  on  Libor  as  the  reference  rate,  any  manipulation  of  the 
submissions for the calculation of the rates can have strong and significant negative impacts on 
consumers and financial markets worldwide.
There  were strong debates  about  how the submissions  could  have  affected the LIBOR. Lively 
discussions erupted online and two major camps formed. The first group of thinkers believed that 
the nature of the LIBOR calculation makes it impossible for any one single bank to manipulate it  
and any manipulations must be the product of several banks colluding with one another(Persaud, 
2012). The second group of thinkers believes that the LIBOR has been manipulated and that any 
bank can manipulate the rates (Smith, 2012). 
From  the  discussions,  there  are  several  key  items  that  will  mentioned  and  discussed.  In  the 
following section, we will be addressing these items. The items that need to be answered are as 
follow:
1. Can LIBOR be manipulated by 1 bank?
2. Were the banks involved in LIBOR colluding? If so, who?
3. Was SIBOR similar?
Experiment
To detect  irregularities  in  the  IBOR rates,  we will  first  extract  data  from suitable  sources.  To 
achieve this, the authors have extracted the LIBOR and SIBOR submission data from Bloomberg 
data services. To cover the period when there were data manipulation, data for LIBOR and SIBOR 
is collected from 2005 to 2012 for 1 Month maturity. This is to ensure consistencies in comparison.
To answer whether LIBOR can be manipulated by a single bank, we have to first understand the 
mechanism of the LIBOR calculation which is based on the concept of trimmed mean. The trimmed 
mean is a type of statistical measure of central tendency which is similar to the mean and median. It  
is calculated by removing both ends of the extreme values. Let us look at the following example.
Assuming that we have 10 banks, and under normal circumstances, we have the rate submitted 
below.
Table 1: Theoretical LIBOR Scenario(No Manipulations)
Let us assumes that Bank 9 wishes to lower LIBOR and submits a very low rate. Below is the 
scenario,
Table 2 Theoretical LIBOR Scenario(With manipulations)
From the example, we can see that the LIBOR has been successfully been lowered. Thus the answer 
to question 1 and 2 is clear, any single bank can through its submission of rates manipulate the rates 
Bank Rates
1 3.0026
2 3.0106
3 3.0235
4 3.0312
5 3.0358
6 3.0434
7 3.0562
8 3.0601
9 3.0658
10 3.0961
LIBOR 3.04168
Bank Rates
1 3.0026
2 3.0106
3 3.0235
4 3.0312
5 3.0358
6 3.0434
7 3.0562
8 3.0601
9 3.0000
10 3.0961
LIBOR 3.0334
without having to even collude with any other banks. Thus it is clear that the existing approach can 
be vulnerable to manipulation. 
To prevent  any manipulations  of the IBORs, the only possible  measure is  to  attempt to detect 
anomalous behavior in the rate submissions. This is considered simple to achieve by conducting 
time series clustering on the data. This is because any banks attempting to manipulate the rates will 
display  behaviors  which  are  distinctively  different  from the  rest  of  banks.  Early  splits  in  the 
dendrogram of cluster analysis will reveal unique clusters of banks which behaves very differently 
from others. This can be seen from the results in the next section. 
Results
We first  begin our analysis  on the 2005 and 2008 data  where there were previous studies that 
Barclays has actually attempted to manipulate the rates. Below is the 2005 cluster analysis results.
Chart 1: LIBOR 2005 Cluster Analysis
From the chart, we can observe that there are several distinct groups. However, Barclays does not 
display any significant deviation from the rest of the banks for 2005 for 1 month maturity. The most 
distinctive groups are the BTMU/NORIN, BOA and DB/RBS. From the distance measured, it is 
clear that most of the rates are quite similar to one another. However, the picture could not have 
been more distinct in the year of 2008 as shown below.
Chart 2: LIBOR 2008 Cluster Analysis
 
From the analysis, we can observe that Barclays display significant deviation from the rest of the 
banks  for  2008  for  1  Month  maturity.  While  there  are  two  major  groups  of  banks,  they  are 
distinctively different from one another and can be attributed to the financial distress from the crisis. 
Banks such as Citibank and JP Morgan were under less severe market conditions as compared to 
Credit Suisse as they were assisted by the TARP.  However, we can see that Barclays is definitely 
different from the rest of the banks as shown below in table 3. Thus for question 2, there was no 
obvious collusion betweent the banks.
Table 3: LIBOR Rates 2008 (Average Daily)
Banks Rates
JPM 2.600
RABO 2.607
DB 2.616
CITI 2.643
BOA 2.648
LLOYDS 2.653
HSBC 2.656
UBS 2.673
RBC 2.673
Overall 2.674
RBS 2.686
CREDIT S. 2.727
NORINCHUKIN 2.727
BTMU 2.738
BARCLAY 2.783
Chart 3: LIBOR 2008 Quarter 3 Cluster Analysis
The  cluster  analysis  result  is  also  verified  by  examining  the  data  from 2008  quarter  3  where 
Barclays has behaved differently from the rest of the banks. We can see that almost all the banks are 
similar compared to Barclays indicating that there were certain actions which were anomalous.  Let 
us review the SIBOR for 2007 and 2008 financial crisis period.
Chart 4: SIBOR 2007 Cluster Analysis
Chart 5: SIBOR 2008 Cluster Analysis
The SIBOR charts (4,5) display information that indicates that there are no distinct individual which 
is very different from the rest of the banks. There are two distinct groups. The first group comprises 
of the major local banks while the second group consists of overseas or international banks. 
Table 4: SIBOR Rates 2007 (Average Daily)
Table 5: SIBOR Rates 2008 (Average Daily)
Banks Rates
DBSD1MO Index 2.627
OUB 2.648
overall 2.658
OCBC 2.662
BOT 2.668
STANCHART 3.375
BNP 3.438
HSBC 3.469
BOA 3.500
DB 3.500
Banks Rates
DBSD1MO Index 1.070
OCBC 1.130
overall 1.152
OUB 1.156
BOT 1.211
STANCHART 3.375
BNP 3.438
HSBC 3.469
BOA 3.500
DB 3.500
The major reason for the differences is the financial distress experienced by the international banks 
in their home country lending markets. Another reason is the lack of exposure of the local banks to 
the  toxic  portfolio  components  of  subprime  lending.  There  are  not  evidence  that  they  were 
attempting to manipulate the rates by colluding with one another.  Thus, for question 3, we can 
safely say that SIBOR is not manipulated during the financial crisis. 
Conclusion
From the analysis, the cluster analysis technique was able to identify Barclays as the bank behaving 
anomalously from the rest of the bank. The dendrogram identifies the most obvious bank which is 
not behaving according to market behavior. In the LIBOR case for 2005 and 2007, there were no 
obvious collusions with the exception of Barclays. SIBOR was not affected by rate manipulation 
between 2007 and 2008. However, the technique has some weaknesses as well.
The cluster analysis while being able to detect rogue behaviors, is unable to identify collusions that 
are extremely well planned  and affects the rates mildly. As demonstrated in the sections above, any 
bank can influence the rates. Suppose several banks wishes to affect the rate by 0.01%, that can be 
done easily by quoting the same lowest rate together and thus forming a group. In the dendrogram, 
they will be found as a group. The group will be so big that they will be similar to the SIBOR case. 
Although further investigation into the manner of grouping might reveal anomalies, it cannot be 
directly inferred from the diagram. In the SIBOR case, the grouping is obvious due to the origin of  
the banks which renders addition investigation uncalled for.  Further  research will  be needed to 
enhance the analysis so that the display of collusion can be incorporated into the analysis. Further 
investigation will also be needed to understand how many banks colluding together will nullify the 
technique as well. 
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